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1 Introduction  
The creation of a banking union is widely seen as a key element of institu-
tional reforms towards more financial and economic stability in Europe. Its 
objective is to improve the effectiveness of banking regulation and supervi-
sion and to sever the link between the finances of national governments and 
the banks in the Eurozone, which was a destabilising force in the European 
debt crisis.  
A key element of the banking union is the creation of a single supervisory 
mechanism.  At the end of 2014, the European Central Bank will take over the 
responsibility for banking supervision in the Eurozone. It will directly super-
vise the largest and systemically most important banks in the Eurozone, a 
group of approximately 130 financial institutions. Before assuming its new 
task the ECB intends to investigate the financial solidity of these banks in the 
framework of a ‘comprehensive assessment’. It is the objective of this as-
sessment ‘to enhance the transparency of the balance sheets of significant 
banks in the euro area, and in so doing, to trigger balance sheet repair where 
necessary, as well as to strengthen confidence.’2  
The asset quality review (AQR), a review of the quality of different types of 
assets including underlying collateral will be the most important element of 
this assessment. The assessment will be combined with a stress test.  
The AQR and the stress test linked to it raise a number of questions. How 
large will the capital shortfall be? Which banks and which member countries 
will be affected? How does the type and level of capital thresholds used in 
the stress test affect the results? How will the required capital be raised? 
Clearly, the answers to these questions depend on what the ECB and the na-
tional authorities participating in the exercise will find in the review. But the 
2 European Central Bank (2014a), p.1 
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results will also depend on the structure of bank balance sheets with current 
valuations. It is therefore interesting to ask whether, on the basis of publicly 
available information, anything can be said about the magnitude of the exist-
ing capital shortfalls3 that can be expected. In this paper we calculate hypo-
thetical capital shortfalls by studying various stress test scenarios using pub-
licly available bank balance sheet data.   
A related, widely discussed issue is whether banks have already reacted and 
taken measures addressing capital shortfalls before the review begins. We 
investigate this by comparing bank balance sheets in 2012 and 2013. 
We start with a status quo scenario and calculate the capital shortfall for the 
common tier 1 (CET1) capital thresholds of 5.5, 8 and 12 % of risk weighted 
assets as well as book equity to asset ratios of three and four per cent. As a 
second step, we consider a scenario where 50% of the currently non-
performing loans have to be written off. Thirdly we assume that, in addition, 
5% of the loans currently classified as performing are reclassified as nonper-
forming. We then consider a market downturn scenario where specific assets 
that are held in banks´ own portfolios (trading securities, assets held for 
sale, as well as held-to-maturity securities and investments in associates) 
lose 10% of their value.  
For the analysis of these scenarios we use data from the Bankscope data-
base. Our analysis includes the 128 banks that were originally selected to be 
covered by the ECBs comprehensive assessment.4 For most of these banks 
3 We define capital shortfalls as the amount of debt funding which would have to be 
converted to equity to meet capital requirements, keeping the size of the balance 
sheet stable. An alternative but less straightforward approach would be to calculate 
the deleveraging which is required to meet the capital thresholds.  
4 On September 26th the ECB reported that the number of banks subject to the AQR is 
131, or 127 banking groups. The full list of the banks included in the AQR is listed in 
European Central Bank (2014b). See also the corresponding statement on the ECB´s 
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almost complete balance sheet data are available for 2013. We also conduct 
the analysis for the year 2012. This allows us to estimate the changes of bank 
capital and capital shortfalls over the year 2013. As mentioned above, this is 
interesting because many observers argue that the upcoming AQR has al-
ready induced many banks to strengthen their capital base. 
In addition, we address the issue of financial stability risks posed by the fact 
that banks are heavily invested in government bonds. We do so by consider-
ing the capital shortfalls that would arise in the case of a restructuring of 
government debt. Due to data limitations we can only do so for a sample of 
49 large Eurozone banks for which the data on sovereign bond holdings is 
provided by the EBA. These banks still account for about 77% of the assets of 
the banks included in the AQR.  
Our main findings are as follows. Under current valuations most banks in the 
Eurozone reach the 8% CET1 threshold. The Eurozone-wide capital shortfall 
would only be 660 mn Euros, a very significant reduction compared to the 
capital shortfall of 15 bn Euros that would exist on the basis of the balance 
sheet data for 2012. While the CET1 threshold thus leads to a negligible short-
fall in 2013 data, things are different if we choose a book-equity-to-asset ratio 
of 3% as the relavant benchmark. For this case we find a capital shortfall of 
19 bn Euros. But compared to 2012 things have improved here as well. The 
shortfall for 2012 was much higher (64 bn Euros).  More ambitious capital 
ratios would, unsurprisingly, lead to higher shortfalls.  
In the stress scenario, where half of the nonperforming loans are written off, 
the overall sum of write offs for the large banks in the Eurozone would be 
about 455 bn Euros, but most of this amount is covered by provisions. To 
achieve the 8% CET1 threshold banks would need to raise 12 bn Euros. Again, 
website: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ssm/assessment/html/index.de.html.  
In our calculations we stick to the 128 banks initially selected to be part of the AQR.  
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achieving a book equity to asset ratio of 3% would be more ambitious and 
requires 23 bn Euros. Adding 5% of the loan portfolio to the nonperforming 
loans that are written off would raise the 3% book equity shortfall to 56 bn, of 
which 13.1 bn would occur in Dutch banks, 13 bn in French and 12 bn in Ger-
man banks.  
Finally, the market downturn scenario (minus 10% on banks´ own portfolios) 
would lead to a capital shortfall of 154 bn Euros for the 8% CET1 threshold 
and 167 bn Euros for the 3% book equity to asset ratio. This time the highest 
capital shortfall (regarding the book equity ratio) would be that of Germany 
with 67 bn Euros followed by France (54 bn). For a 4% book equity to asset 
ratio, the overall capital shortfall increases to 306 bn Euros.  
Our analysis shows that, under the relatively benign scenarios considered 
here, the capital shortfalls that occur relative to the 8% CET1 threshold are 
certainly manageable. While write-offs of nonperforming loans are likely to 
occur, there are considerable provisions that can absorb losses, in particular 
in Spain and Italy, but also in France. In contrast, using the book equity to 
asset threshold leads to much higher results for the capital shortfall and 
these shortfalls would also affect Germany and France. 
Regarding the impact of government debt restructurings our results show that 
many banks are heavily invested in domestic government bonds. But never-
theless, due to relatively high common tier 1 capital most banks would still 
meet the 8% benchmark after a haircut of, for example, sovereign debt in 
Portugal. Even a haircut in a large country would not change this result signif-
icantly. For instance, a 40% haircut on Italian government bonds would cause 
bank losses in the Eurozone of about 75 bn Euros, but of which 54 bn Euros 
would only hit Italian banks. The 8% CET1 benchmark would only lead to a 
shortfall in Italian banks of about 26 bn Euros. 
In the literature, stress tests in the European banking system and the differ-
ent aspects of banking union have been discussed intensively. The contribu-
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tion most closely related to this paper is Acharya and Steffen (2014). They 
also use bank balance sheet data to assess bank capital shortfalls for differ-
ent stress test scenarios. The main difference to this paper is that we consid-
er different and additional scenarios and use more up-to-date data. In partic-
ular, Acharya and Steffen (2014) do not look at government bonds exposures. 
In this regard our paper is complementary to Acharya and Steffen (2014). Our 
paper uses the 2013 balance sheet data and, in combination with the data for 
2012, we are able to show whether and by how much banks improved their 
capital base over the year 2013. 
As the capital shortfall regarding the CET1 benchmarks and the book equity 
ratio decreased significantly over the year 2013, banks in the Eurozone must 
have improved their CET1 ratio as well as reduced their leverage ratio. The 
(unweighted) average CET1 ratio over all 128 banks increased to 15.4% in 
2013, an increase of more than 2 percentage points over the year. The aver-
age book equity ratio also increased, from 6.1% at the end of 2012 to almost 
6.9% one year later. Banks used different strategies to improve the equity 
ratios: Many banks chose to reduce risk-weighted and total assets, but there 
are also quite a few that increased equity. 
The rest of this paper is set up as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief de-
scription of the ECB’s comprehensive assessment of the European banking 
system. In section 3 we describe the data we are using and provide some 
descriptive statistics, particularly regarding the changes between the years 
2012 and 2013. Section 4 includes the scenarios and the results of our analy-
sis. In section 5 we discuss the findings and the policy conclusions emerging 
from the analysis. 
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2 The comprehensive assessment and the AQR    
The AQR aims at assessing the systemic stability of the European banking 
system by evaluating the adequacy of the equity of the 131 most important 
European banks.5  This evaluation is done in two steps. The first step is the 
assessment of the status quo. The second step consists of the application of 
a stress scenario to banks´ assets. The results are to show whether banks are 
able to withstand various crisis scenarios. In both steps the EBA estimates 
the gap between certain benchmarks for the capital requirements and banks´ 
equity. How banks will react to equity gaps is an open question. Most likely, 
they would react by a combination of deleveraging and increasing their equi-
ty.     
Under the stress scenario the following risk categories will be affected: credit 
risk, market risk, sovereign risk, securitization, and cost of funding. The as-
sets that will be stressed include both the trading book and the banking 
book. The results of the AQR will be published at the end of October 2014. 
The benchmarks for the capital requirements are 8% common equity tier 1 
(CET1) for the status quo scenario and 5.5% for the stress scenario. The 8% 
CET1-ratio consists of 4.5% core tier 1 equity, a surcharge of 1% for systemi-
cally important financial institutions, and 2.5% capital conservation buffer. 
For the stress scenarios it is assumed that banks are allowed to use the capi-
tal conservation buffer completely to compensate for losses. Therefore the 
minimum capital requirements are reduced to 5.5% in the crisis scenario. 
Our analysis has two aims: first, our results can be interpreted as a prediction 
of the results of the comprehensive assessment as we conduct a similar in-
vestigation on aggregated bank data, albeit without reviewing current asset 
5 See e.g. European Central Bank (2014a, b) and European Banking Association 
(2014). 
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valuation. Second, we intend to provide additional insights into the stability 
of the banking system by applying stress tests which will not be part of the 
AQR (e.g. haircut on the sovereign debt of Portugal, Spain, and Italy), as well 
as by using additional benchmarks for the capital requirements. And third, 
we investigate the change of bank risk over time by analyzing both the bal-
ance sheet data of 2012 and of 2013. 
Obviously, the ECB and the EBA will have much more detailed information on 
the bank´s risk exposure and the quality of the assets. As our study uses only 
balance sheet data it is based on the (publicly available) information set of 
informed capital market participants. Therefore our results should be similar 
to the expectations of these market participants. 
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3 Data  
For our analysis we use balance sheet data for 128 banks which will be inves-
tigated in the AQR.6 For most of these banks almost complete balance sheet 
data are available from the Bankscope database. For the evaluation of the 
effects of a haircut on sovereign bonds we restrict our analysis to 49 large 
European banks for which the EBA provides detailed data on the sovereign 
bond holdings. The total assets of these 49 banks amount to approximately 
77% of the total assets of the 128 banks which are analyzed throughout the 
other parts of the study. 
The data sample uses balance sheet data until the end of December 2013 for 
all simulations. For the analysis of the sovereign bond holdings and the con-
sequences of a haircut on sovereign debt the data sample includes infor-
mation on the breakdown of bond holdings (by bank and by country) until 
June 30, 2013, but we again use the balance sheet of 2013 to evaluate the 
effects of a haircut. We are additionally using the balance sheet data for 2012 
to show how the situation regarding the stability of banks changed over the 
course of the year 2013. 
Table 1A in the appendix shows the basic financial statistics for all banks 
included in the AQR for 2013. The table gives the information on the CET1 
ratio (= CET1 relative to risk-weighted assets), the ratio of risk-weighted as-
sets to total assets as well as the ratio of book equity relative to total assets.7  
6 On September 26th the ECB reported that the number of banks subject to the AQR is 
131, or 127 banking groups. The full list of the banks included in the AQR is listed in 
European Central Bank (2014b). See also the corresponding statement on the ECB´s 
website: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ssm/assessment/html/index.de.html.  
In our calculations we stick to the 128 banks initially selected to be part of the AQR. 
7 In Table 2A in the appendix the same data are given for the year 2012. 
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The median bank has the following characteristics in 2013 (see the following 
Table 1): total assets are equal to 61.3 bn Euro, the risk-weighted assets are 
40.5% of the total assets, the CET1 ratio is 13.2 %, and the book equity 
amounts to 6.2% of the total assets.  
The comparison between the two years 2013 and 2012 shows that the median 
bank reduced total assets by 1.9 bn Euro, increased the CET1 ratio by 1.7 and 
the book equity to assets-ratio by 0.8 percentage points. The ratio of risk-
weighted to total assets declined by almost 4 percentage points which 
means a reduction in risk-weighted assets by about 3 bn Euros. Overall, the 
median bank reduced its assets and improved its equity base. 
Table 1: Basic Financial Statistics for the 128 Banks included in the AQR: 
Summary Statistics for 2013 and 2012 
Assets (= total assets) in million Euro; CET1 is the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (in %); 
RWA = ratio of risk-weighted assets relative to total assets (in %); Equity = ratio of 
book equity to total assets (in %).  
 Assets RWA CET1 Equity 
2013 
Median 61260 40.5 13.2 6.2 
Mean8 179275 42.9 15.4 6.9 
Minimum 567 6.7 5.8 0.1 
Maximum 1800139 110.0 112.2 32.9 
2012 
Median 63200 44.4 11.5 5.4 
Mean 199995 44.9 13.2 6.1 
Minimum 485 1.4 -6.7 -4.3 
Maximum 2012329 110.7 116.4 35.5 
 
8 The mean is the unweighted average over all banks. 
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The comparison of the mean values shows similar changes over the year 2013 
regarding the CET1 and the book equity ratios. As the mean value of total as-
sets is significantly higher than the median the distribution of total assets is 
skewed to the right: Most of the banks exhibit relatively low values for total 
assets, but the sample also includes a small number of very large banks. 
Looking at the change of the mean values the reduction of total assets over 
the year 2013 was a remarkably high 20 bn Euros which was significantly 
driven by the largest banks in the sample. 
Although the mean of the RWA ratio increased over 2013, the mean values of 
the risk-weighted assets actually decreased by about 4 bn Euros. The in-
crease in the ratio is due to the fact that total assets had even been reduced 
by a much higher pace. 
The minimum and maximum values exhibit a high variation amongst the 
banks in the sample. For the CET1-ratio and the book equity ratio this differ-
ence between the best and the worst banks shrank over the year 2013 and 
the minimum values increased significantly.  
There are also significant differences in the adjustment strategies of the 
banks between the very large and the smaller banks in Europe. In the follow-
ing we rank the 128 European banks under consideration by total assets and 
form two groups: The first group consists of the 10 largest banks and the sec-
ond group contains the following 118 banks. Both groups represent about 
50% of the total assets of all 128 banks. 
As Table 2 reveals the 10 largest banks reduced not only total assets and risk-
weighted assets over the year 2013. These banks reduced book equity and, to 
a smaller extent, CET1 as well. The reduction in total and risk-weighted assets 
is therefore the main adjustment mechanism regarding the improvement of 
their capital ratios. 
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The 118 smaller banks forming group no. 2 diminished total and risk-
weighted assets as well, but these banks also increased both book equity 
and CET1 by a significant amount. The consequence is a higher CET1 ratio and 
a lower leverage.  
Table 2: Comparison of Balance-Sheet Adjustments Between 2012 and 
2013 by Bank Size 
Assets = total assets; CET1 = common equity tier 1; RWA = risk-weighted assets;  
Equity = book equity.   
 Assets RWA CET1 Equity 
Difference between 2013 and 2012 in million Euro 
All 128 Banks -2252101 -294831 +102075 +30648 
10 Largest 
Banks -1211016 -76656 -7343 -22506 
118 “Small-
er” Banks -1041085 -218175 +109418 +53154 
Change between 2013 and 2012 in per cent 
All 128 Banks -8.9% -3.7% +10.4% +2.6% 
10 Largest 
Banks -9.5% -2.0% -1.5% -3.7% 
118 “Small-
er” Banks -8.4% -5.3% +22.5% +9.2% 
 
Overall the comparison between 2012 and 2013 leads to the cautious as-
sessment that the stability of the banks under consideration has improved. 
In section 4.1 an additional analysis of the most significant changes between 
2013 and 2012 is conducted on the country level.  
A cautious assessment is necessary for at least two reasons. First of all, our 
analysis is only based on balance sheet data. We do not have access to the 
more detailed information set on risk exposures and asset quality as is avail-
able to the bank supervisors. The second reason is that Bankscope and the 
14 
 
 
 
other data sources we are using do not deliver complete balance sheet in-
formation for all of the 128 banks of the AQR. As Table 1A reveals the dataset 
is partly incomplete for 21 out of these 128 banks.9 As these 21 banks only 
represent about 5% of the total assets of all 128 banks we expect that our 
analysis is still meaningful and representative.  
Table 3A (in the appendix) lists the 49 banks for which we investigate the 
effects of haircuts on sovereign bonds in Portugal, Spain, and Italy (see sec-
tion 4.4 for the results of these scenarios). For these very large banks our 
dataset is almost complete. Only for two banks – one German and one Greek 
bank – is the dataset to some part incomplete. These 49 banks represent 
77% of the total assets of all banks included in the AQR. 
 
9 The 21 banks (out of 128 banks) for which the dataset is incomplete are from France 
(6), Luxembourg (4), Spain (3), Germany (3), Latvia (2), as well as Cyprus (1), Greece 
(1), and Slovenia (1). 
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4 Scenarios and results 
The scenarios we simulate aim at investigating the financial stability of the 
banking system in the Eurozone under different conditions regarding the real-
ization of specific financial risks. As a result of the simulations we calculate 
capital shortfalls which are likely to occur under the scenario conditions.  
To evaluate the results of the simulations we are using several thresholds 
regarding the relation of book equity to (not-risk weighted) total assets as 
well as the common equity tier 1 ratio. For the book equity ratio we apply the 
usual 3% threshold and, in addition, a slightly more prudent 4% ratio.10  For 
the CET1 ratio we use three different thresholds: The official value of 8% for 
the CET1 ratio for large banks (consisting of 4.5% core tier 1 plus 2.5% capital 
conservation buffer plus a 1% surcharge for systemically important financial 
institutions) that is used as the main threshold in the AQR, a threshold of 
5.5% which is used in the AQR to estimate capital shortfalls in the stress sce-
narios (i.e. 8% minus the capital conservation buffer), as well as a more pru-
dent ratio of 12% which is not used in the AQR. 
4.1 Unstressed Situation 
The first scenario evaluates the status quo and shows whether banks fulfil 
the capital requirements when no specific financial stress will realize. As can 
be seen from Table 2 most banks in the Eurozone will exhibit no or only a very 
small CET1 capital shortfall with respect to the 8% benchmark. The calculated 
shortfalls for the 12% benchmark show that particularly Italian and Portu-
10 According to Haldane (2012) a book-equity-to-asset ratio of 4 per cent would have 
been required for banks to avoid failure in the recent financial crisis, for large banks 
even 7 per cent. 
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guese, but also German and Austrian banks seem to be more vulnerable than 
the banks in other countries of the Eurozone. 
Table 3: Results for the Status quo Scenario for the End of the Year 2013 
EQ3 and EQ4: Thresholds for the ratio of book equity to not-risk weighted total assets 
of either 3 or 4%. CET1-5.5, CET1-8, CET1-12: Thresholds for the CET1 ratio of 5.5% (for 
stress scenarios only), 8%, and 12%. In million Euro. 
 EQ3 EQ4 CET1-5.5 CET1-8 CET1-12 
AUSTRIA 0 0 0 0 2281 
BELGIUM 3039 6572 0 0 0 
CYPRUS 60 107 0 0 403 
ESTONIA 0 0 0 0 0 
FINLAND 0 2676 0 0 0 
FRANCE 10526 16487 0 0 0 
GERMANY 884 14429 0 0 3419 
GREECE 0 0 0 0 1130 
IRELAND 2876 5821 0 0 195 
ITALY 0 1971 0 661 18776 
LATVIA 0 0 0 0 0 
LUXEMBOURG 0 0 0 0 0 
MALTA 0 0 0 0 84 
NETHER-
LANDS 1440 5194 0 0 0 
PORTUGAL 0 4 0 0 2106 
SLOVAKIA 0 0 0 0 0 
SLOVENIA 0 0 0 0 0 
SPAIN 412 964 0 0 1333 
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Nevertheless, the situation improved significantly compared to the year 2012 
(see Table 4) in which particularly banks in Cyprus, Greece, and Spain still 
exhibited large capital shortfalls.  
Table 4: Results for the Status quo Scenario for the End of the Year 2012 
EQ3 and EQ4: Thresholds for the ratio of book equity to not-risk weighted total assets 
of either 3 or 4%. CET1-5.5, CET1-8, CET1-12: Thresholds for the CET1 ratio of 5.5% (for 
stress scenarios only), 8%, and 12%. In million Euro. 
 EQ3 EQ4 CET1-5.5 CET1-8 CET1-12 
AUSTRIA 0 0 0 0 2242 
BELGIUM 8789 15199 0 0 0 
CYPRUS 595 905 1057 1597 2519 
ESTONIA 0 0 0 0 0 
FINLAND 979 4399 0 0 0 
FRANCE 11738 22773 0 0 378 
GERMANY 7577 41997 0 0 3650 
GREECE 13319 16257 7872 9485 12689 
IRELAND 4601 8319 0 0 272 
ITALY 111 2428 0 263 15122 
LATVIA 0 0 0 0 0 
LUXEM-
BOURG 
0 0 0 0 0 
MALTA 0 0 0 0 152 
NETHER-
LANDS 
4021 9470 0 62 885 
PORTUGAL 0 0 0 0 1943 
SLOVAKIA 0 0 0 0 0 
SLOVENIA 0 0 0 0 523 
SPAIN 12488 18396 402 4024 25918 
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When looking at the book equity ratios the situation is slightly worse: for 24 
out of the 128 banks the book equity is less than 3% of the total assets.  The 
highest shortfall is to be expected in France (10.5 bn), Belgium (3.0 bn) and 
Ireland (2.8 bn).  
But again, compared to the situation at the end of 2012 the book equity rati-
os of most banks improved significantly. This is particularly true for Greece 
with a reduction of the book equity shortfall of -13.3 bn, Spain (-12.1 bn), 
Germany (-6.7 bn), and Belgium (-5.8 bn). Only in France, the country with the 
highest book equity shortfall, there was no significant change in bank risk 
over the year 2013. 
The improvements in the CET1-ratio and book equity ratio that occurred dur-
ing 2013 in most countries could be either due to an increase in capital or a 
reduction in assets or both. To shed more light on the details of the adjust-
ments Table 5 gives the percent changes of these balance sheet positions 
over the year 2013.  
The countries with the most significant reduction in the book equity shortfall 
over the year 2013 are Greece, Germany, and Spain. But also in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Cyprus the book equity ratio improved clearly. In 
almost all of these countries banks achieved this improvement by reducing 
total assets. The only exception is Greece where the banks increased total 
assets but over-compensated the distorting effect by a strong growth in book 
equity. With the exceptions of the Netherlands and Ireland all of the above 
mentioned countries also increased book equity. Thus, reducing total assets 
and increasing book equity was the strategy chosen by most banks.  
Regarding the CET1-ratio the situation is more heterogeneous. Most of the 
banks in the abovementioned countries also improved the ratio of common 
equity tier 1 to risk-weighted assets to a certain amount and did so by a re-
duction in risk-weighted assets. But with regard to equity about half of the 
countries decreased and the other half increased common tier 1-capital.  
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Table 5: Change in Assets and Capital over the Year 2013 
Change in total assets, risk-weighted assets, book equity, and common tier 1 capital 
over the year 2013. In percent of the values of 2012.  
 Total Assets RW Assets Book Equity C Tier 1 
AUSTRIA -6.0 -0.7 -8.2 -4.6 
BELGIUM -19.3 -24.2 1.9 -1.5 
CYPRUS -43.4 -37.7 113.9 223.0 
ESTONIA 2.3 48.4 5.2 12.1 
FINLAND -8.7 12.2 4.4 4.3 
FRANCE -6.0 15.3 1.7 13.8 
GERMANY -14.2 -26.4 3.3 1.4 
GREECE 18.4 39.6 Increase 11 371.6 
IRELAND -14.8 -7.5 -16.4 -15.8 
ITALY -7.2 -5.3 -13.2 -7.8 
LATVIA 5.0 -15.2 8.9 6.4 
LUXEMBOURG -2.9 64.6 6.3 68.2 
MALTA 0.3 -0.7 8.5 10.0 
NETHERLANDS -8.6 15.0 -5.5 -3.1 
PORTUGAL -4.8 -7.1 -10.9 -6.6 
SLOVAKIA 2.1 -4.3 2.6 2.9 
SLOVENIA -11.2 -28.9 25.2 21.5 
SPAIN -8.6 -4.6 10.2 -3.1 
 
In those countries with an obvious failure of systemic stability or at least a 
high threat of instability in 2012 – Cyprus and Greece – CET1 increased im-
pressively. Astonishingly, in Italy, Portugal, and Spain – also countries that 
were at the brink of systemic crisis – CET1 has been reduced over the year 
2013.  
11 The aggregated book equity for the Greek banks was 7258 in 2013 and -1126 in 
2012. Due to the negative basis a percent change is not meaningful. 
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To sum up, in most countries of the Eurozone banks considerably reduced 
their risk of financial instability. In particular, the book equity to asset ratio 
has been improved by decreasing total assets as well as increasing book 
equity. Only in France, a country with a relatively high book equity shortfall in 
2012, the situation did show only a minor change over the year 2013. Irre-
spective of these positive results, the capital buffers do not seem to be very 
high: The application of the more prudent 4% book equity benchmark would 
cause significant shortfalls particularly in France (16.5 bn) and Germany (14.4 
bn). 
4.2 Writing-off Non-Performing Loans 
The next scenario we are simulating is the write-off of non-performing loans. 
We are assuming that 50% of the non-performing loans are written off and 
consider existing loan provisions. This is a major difference compared to 
Acharya/Steffen (2014) who simulate a 100% write off and do not include the 
loan provisions into their calculations. As the loan provisions show large dif-
ferentials amongst the banking sectors of the Eurozone countries, consider-
ing the loan provisions not only makes a significant difference in absolute 
terms but also changes the comparison across countries substantially. 
Table 6 summarizes the main results. Focusing on gross-write-offs only, the 
banking sectors of Italy (111 bn), Spain (99 bn), and France (71 bn) would 
have to bear the largest burden amongst all Eurozone countries. But the re-
sults change significantly when the net-write-offs (= write-offs minus loan 
provisions) are investigated. The ranking of the largest net-write-offs is led by 
the Spanish banking sector (16.2 bn), followed by Greece (10.8 bn), Germany 
(8.1 bn) and then Italy (7.1 bn). Compared to 2012 gross-write-offs increased 
significantly in some countries. The strongest increases are in Italy (+17.8 
bn), Greece (+ 15.8 bn), and Spain (+15.1 bn). However, it is only in Spain that 
net-write-offs grew remarkably, too (+13.9 bn). In the other two countries 
higher loan provisions neutralized most of the increase in write-offs. 
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Table 6: Writing Off 50% of Non-Performing Loans (NPL): Additional Capi-
tal Shortfalls compared to the Unstressed Scenario  
Write-off: minus 50% of NPL, Net-Write-Off: Write-off minus loan provisions. EQ3 and 
EQ4: Thresholds for the ratio of book equity to not-risk weighted total assets of either 
3 or 4%. CET1-5.5, CET1-8, CET1-12: Thresholds for the CET1 ratio of 5.5% (for stress 
scenarios only), 8%, and 12%. In million Euro for the year 2013. 
 Write-
Off 
Net-
Write-
Off 
EQ3 EQ4 CET1-
5.5 
CET1- 
8 
CET1-
12 
AUSTRIA 13233 386 0 0 0 0 102 
BELGIUM 8954 1190 22 23 0 0 0 
CYPRUS 4876 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
ESTONIA 85 10 0 0 0 0 0 
FINLAND 1261 178 0 171 0 0 0 
FRANCE 71274 139 135 134 0 0 0 
GERMANY 36347 8111 3041 5874 597 1401 4081 
GREECE 43149 10785 0 386 38 1806 5185 
IRELAND 35909 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ITALY 111431 7087 0 495 640 2968 5519 
LATVIA 191 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LUX. 311 31 0 0 0 0 0 
MALTA 238 79 0 0 0 33 70 
NET. 19479 4792 397 735 0 0 5 
POR. 6574 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SLOVAKIA 596 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SLOVENIA 1911 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SPAIN 99040 16169 478 909 1753 5210 12808 
 
The other five columns of Table 6 show the additional capital shortfalls com-
pared to the unstressed scenario which are due to the NPL write-off. These 
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additional shortfalls are relatively small and hit only four countries: The most 
severe mismatch relative to the 8% CET1 benchmark would realize in Spain 
(5.2 bn), Italy (3 bn), Greece (1.8 bn), and Germany (1.4 bn). However, the 
application of the 5.5 % benchmark which is used in the AQR for stress sce-
narios does not show any major capital shortfall, with the exception of Spain 
(1.8 bn). 
Compared to the end of 2012 particularly the Greek banking sector signifi-
cantly reduced the potential capital shortfall under this scenario. In Spain the 
situation deteriorated strongly with respect to CET1 but improved for book 
equity. For all other countries the changes over the year 2013 are relatively 
small. 
Looking at the book equity to asset ratio only the German banking sector 
would show a larger shortfall of 3 bn Euros. But again this seems to be a 
manageable amount. 
The AQR might lead to the result that additional loans have to be assessed as 
non-performing. To cover this aspect of the AQR we also simulate the effect 
on bank capital if 5% of the existing loans will be classified additionally as 
not performing. Table 7 shows the results for the book equity to asset ratio.  
Compared to the unstressed scenario some countries would face an enor-
mous additional capital requirement to meet the 3% benchmark. The highest 
book equity shortfall would occur in the Dutch banking sector (11.7 bn), 
closely followed by the German banking sector (10.9 bn) and the banks in 
Belgium (3.9 bn). But overall these capital shortfalls do not look as impres-
sive as their counterparts for the year 2012. Particularly in Germany the situa-
tion improved clearly as in 2012 the shortfall would have been 15.9 bn Euros 
higher. Also in Greece and Spain banks now exhibit a much better capital 
base. Most of this improvement in Germany and Spain stems from a reduc-
tion in total assets whereas in Greece higher book equity contributed to the 
improved situation. 
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Table 7: Write Off 50% of Non-Performing Loans (NPL) plus Classification 
of additional 5% of the Loans as Non-Performing: Additional Net-Write-
Offs and additional Capital Shortfalls compared to the Unstressed Sce-
nario  
Net-Write-Off: Write-off minus loan provisions. EQ3 and EQ4: Thresholds for the ratio 
of book equity to not-risk weighted total assets of either 3 or 4%. In million Euro for 
the year 2013. 
 Net-Write-Off EQ3 EQ4 
AUSTRIA 3377 0 100 
BELGIUM 9656 3933 5342 
CYPRUS 157 85 84 
ESTONIA 211 0 0 
FINLAND 4727 2532 2873 
FRANCE 49297 2447 3732 
GERMANY 46215 10857 27012 
GREECE 14985 602 1394 
IRELAND 2219 97 96 
ITALY 25532 2973 4844 
LATVIA 65 0 0 
LUXEMBOURG 742 0 0 
MALTA 221 0 0 
NETHERLANDS 38615 11681 22057 
PORTUGAL 363 0 0 
SLOVAKIA 230 0 0 
SLOVENIA 69 0 0 
SPAIN 47807 1305 5429 
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4.3 Effect of a Market Downturn 
A main source of bank risk is a possible decrease in market prices. To ap-
proximate the potential losses of banks in the Eurozone caused by deteriorat-
ing asset values we simulate a 10% negative shock to the value of specific 
assets which the banks are invested in. We use the balance position “Other 
Earning Assets” and deduct the value of derivatives as well as loans and ad-
vances to other banks. The remaining position mainly consists of trading se-
curities, assets held for sale, as well as held-to-maturity securities and in-
vestments in associates which are essential parts of the banks´ own portfoli-
os. 
A downturn of the values of these assets would significantly deteriorate both 
the CET1 ratios as well as the book equity ratios of banks in almost all coun-
tries of the Eurozone. Even when applying the relatively low benchmark of a 
CET1 ratio of 5.5% the banks in the Eurozone would have to face – compared 
to the unstressed scenario - an additional capital shortfall of about 58 bn 
Euro. Most of this capital shortfall would realize in France (33 bn), Germany 
(14.4 bn) and Spain (7.5 bn). Relative to the 8% CET1-ratio the capital short-
fall would even increase to ca. 154 bn Euro across the banks of the Eurozone. 
Applying this higher threshold the French banking sector would face a short-
fall of 75 bn, the German of 30 bn and in Italy and Spain the gap in CET1 
would be 22bn and 15.8 bn. 
When looking at the 3% book to equity benchmark the countries mentioned 
above would also rank highest with Germany (66 bn) showing the most sig-
nificant mismatch followed by France (43.8 bn) and Spain (11.9 bn).  The 
Netherlands (9.1 bn) and Belgium (7.5 bn) also exhibit a significant shortfall. 
But again, compared to 2012 the capitalization of the banks involved in the 
AQR show a clear improvement. At the end of 2013 the CET1 shortfall (5.5% 
benchmark), although still substantial, was 14 bn Euros lower than one year 
earlier, regarding the 8% CET1 benchmark the reduction amounts also to 14 
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bn Euros. With regard to the 3% book equity ratio the shortfall decreased 
from 198 bn (end of 2012) to 147 bn Euros one year later. These results show 
that bank still have to substantially increase their capital to assets ratios. But 
the announced AQR may have already motivated banks to move in the right 
direction. 
Table 8: Results for the Market Downturn Scenario: Additional Capital 
Shortfalls compared to the Unstressed Scenario 
EQ3 and EQ4: Thresholds for the ratio of book equity to not-risk weighted total assets 
of either 3 or 4%. CET1-5.5, CET1-8, CET1-12: Thresholds for the CET1 ratio of 5.5% (for 
stress scenarios only), 8%, and 12%. In million Euro for 2013. 
 EQ3 EQ4 CET1-5.5 CET1-8 CET1-12 
AUSTRIA 0 69 2 1637 9084 
BELGIUM 7513 11447 332 2343 8150 
CYPRUS 32 32 0 0 436 
ESTONIA 0 0 0 0 0 
FINLAND 3978 4304 0 550 4105 
FRANCE 43809 98283 32968 75497 157204 
GERMANY 66006 92474 14384 30365 69502 
GREECE 0 489 0 1609 4381 
IRELAND 339 335 0 0 4525 
ITALY 4669 5454 1831 22056 50158 
LATVIA 57 89 0 0 0 
LUXEMBOURG 1 382 610 1127 1954 
MALTA 0 0 42 203 375 
NETHERLANDS 9094 19498 0 895 12720 
PORTUGAL 710 1926 0 1308 2407 
SLOVAKIA 0 0 0 0 13 
SLOVENIA 0 0 0 0 111 
SPAIN 11865 17272 7492 15874 57845 
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4.4 Effect of a Haircut on Sovereign Debt 
In the last series of simulations we investigate the consequences of a 40% 
haircut on sovereign debt in Portugal, Italy, and Spain. In this analysis we 
include 49 banks out of the set of banks for which the AQR is conducted. For 
these 49 banks of the Eurozone the EBA provides disaggregated data on the 
sovereign bond holdings, differentiated by issuing countries and investing 
banks. The latest update of this data is for June 2013. For these simulations 
we are using this information provided by the EBA and combine it with the 
balance sheet data (end of 2013) from the Bankscope database. 
A 40% haircut on the Portuguese sovereign bonds would cause an overall 
loss of about 8.5 bn across the 49 banks in the Eurozone that are included in 
our analysis. The capital shortfall with respect to the 3% book equity ratio 
would be relatively small (0.6 bn) and would only hit Portuguese banks. The 
same haircut on Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds would cause signifi-
cantly higher capital shortfalls. With respect to the 8% CET1 benchmark the 
shortfalls would be 26 bn Euros in case of Italy and 12bn in case of a haircut 
on Spanish sovereign bonds. But again, this deterioration of the bank capital 
would have to be borne almost entirely by the domestic banking sector of 
these countries.12  
Direct effects on other countries due to the haircuts are almost zero in all 
three simulations. This is mainly due to an improvement of the capitalization 
of Greek banks, but also in Germany and France over the year 2013. 
 
  
12 Table 5A in the appendix shows the results for a haircut on Spanish sovereign 
bonds. 
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Table 9: Effects of a 40% Haircut on Portuguese Sovereign Bonds: Addi-
tional Capital Requirements compared to the unstressed Scenario13 
EQ3 and EQ4: Thresholds for the ratio of book equity to not-risk weighted total assets 
of either 3 or 4%. CET1-5.5, CET1-8, CET1-12: Thresholds for the CET1 ratio of 5.5% (for 
stress scenarios only), 8%, and 12%. In million Euro for the year 2013. 
 EQ3 EQ4 CET1-5.5 CET1-8 CET1-12 
AUSTRIA 0 0 0 0 2 
BELGIUM 0 0 0 0 0 
CYPRUS 0 0 0 0 0 
FINLAND 0 0 0 0 0 
FRANCE 0 0 0 0 0 
GERMANY 0 257 0 0 62 
GREECE 0 0 0 0 0 
IRELAND 0 0 0 0 0 
ITALY 0 64 0 0 78 
LUXEMBOURG 0 0 0 0 0 
MALTA 0 0 0 0 1 
NETHERLANDS 0 0 0 0 0 
PORTUGAL 637 1827 0 0 8610 
SLOVENIA 0 0 0 0 0 
SPAIN 0 0 0 0 228 
  
13 The results for the unstressed scenario for these 49 banks are shown in Table 3A in 
the Appendix. 
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Table 10: Effects of a 40% Haircut on Italian Sovereign Bonds: Additional 
Capital Requirements compared to the unstressed Scenario14 
EQ3 and EQ4: Thresholds for the ratio of book equity to not-risk weighted total assets 
of either 3 or 4%. CET1-5.5, CET1-8, CET1-12: Thresholds for the CET1 ratio of 5.5% (for 
stress scenarios only), 8%, and 12%. In million Euro for the year 2013. 
 EQ3 EQ4 CET1-5.5 CET1-8 CeT1-12 
AUSTRIA 0 0 0 0 100 
BELGIUM 0 0 0 0 0 
CYPRUS 0 0 0 0 21 
FINLAND 0 0 0 0 0 
FRANCE 0 0 0 0 392 
GERMANY 129 3174 0 0 1550 
GREECE 0 0 0 0 45 
IRELAND 0 0 0 0 0 
ITALY 11610 13013 11226 26348 52233 
LUXEMBOURG 0 0 0 0 0 
MALTA 0 0 0 0 0 
NETHERLANDS 0 266 0 0 0 
PORTUGAL 0 19 0 0 4378 
SLOVENIA 0 0 0 0 0 
SPAIN 0 0 0 0 1153 
  
14 The results for the unstressed scenario for these 49 banks are shown in Table 3A in 
the Appendix. 
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5 Conclusions 
Our results show that the large banks of the Eurozone that are included in the 
AQR are better capitalized at the end of 2013 than one year earlier. The capi-
tal shortfalls – both with regard to common equity tier 1 and to book equity – 
diminished significantly, particularly in Greece, Spain, Italy, and Germany. 
This is mainly due to a reduction in total assets and risk-weighted assets in 
many banks, but also to an improvement in the capital base.  
Despite these improvements, capital shortfalls would still occur in our sce-
narios, even in the status quo scenario. The most significant shortfall would 
realize in our market downturn scenario. It is a striking feature of our results 
that capital shortfalls are much larger in the case of book-equity-to-total-
asset-ratios. According to Haldane (2012) the simple book-equity-to-assets 
ratio is much better at predicting failures of banks, in particular large banks, 
than risk weighted measures like CET1.15 Banks seem to be relatively success-
ful in approaching and reaching the official benchmarks set by the supervi-
sors, but additional reserves are not yet built up sufficiently. 
Caution is also warranted because we consider stress scenarios in isolation. 
In a real world crisis situation it is likely that events like a haircut on govern-
ment debt would probably coincide with a general market downturn, so that 
capital shortfalls may be much larger than suggested by the isolated scenari-
os considered here. 
Nevertheless the process initiated by the CRD IV directive has been enforced 
by the announcement of the AQR and motivated banks to improve their capi-
15 The limitations of risk weighting are also emphasized by Admati and Hellwig(2013). 
Schleer et al. (2014) show in addition that a high leverage of banks leads to more 
significant restrictions concerning the credit flows to the private sector in crisis peri-
ods.   
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tal base. Although what has happened so far is not enough, at least the anal-
ysis of static balance sheet data performed here suggests that the capital 
base of the European banking system seems to be moving into the right di-
rection.  
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Appendix 
Table 1A: Basic Financial Statistics for the Banks included in the AQR  
for the End of the Year 2013  
Assets (= total assets) in million Euro; CET1 is the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (in %); 
RWA = ratio of risk-weighted assets relative to total assets (in %); Equity = ratio of 
book equity to total assets (in %). Datasource: Bankscope. 
Bank Country Assets CET1 RWA Equity 
BAWAG PSK Group AUSTRIA 36402 15.3 43.9 7.7 
Erste Group Bank AG AUSTRIA 199876 11.8 49.0 7.4 
Oesterreichische 
Volksbanken AG 
AUSTRIA 20904 14.1 53.9 5.8 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Oesterreich AG 
AUSTRIA 147324 10.4 60.6 8.0 
Raiffeisenlandesbank 
Niederoesterreich-
Wien AG 
AUSTRIA 29070 11.6 43.7 8.1 
Raiffeisenlandesbank 
Oberoesterreich AG 
AUSTRIA 37432 9.8 73.5 9.5 
AXA Bank Europe 
SA/NV 
BELGIUM 36886 17.4 13.2 2.2 
Argenta Spaarbank-
ASPA 
BELGIUM 32147 17.7 22.5 4.3 
Bank of New York 
Mellon SA/NV 
BELGIUM 53982 17.3 16.8 3.5 
Belfius Banque SA/NV BELGIUM 182777 15.4 23.3 3.6 
Dexia BELGIUM 222936 21.4 21.3 1.8 
KBC Groep NV/ KBC 
Groupe SA 
BELGIUM 241306 15.8 37.5 6.0 
Bank of Cyprus Public 
Company Ltd 
CYPRUS 30342 10.2 73.7 9.0 
Co-operative Central 
Bank Limited 
CYPRUS 3555   8.4 
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Hellenic Bank Public 
Company Limited 
CYPRUS 6384 13.1 38.6 6.3 
RCB Bank Ltd CYPRUS 4787 26.2 6.7 1.8 
DNB Pank AS ESTONIA 567   17.3 
SEB Pank ESTONIA 4443 21.2 74.3 17.4 
Swedbank As ESTONIA 8932 32.5 63.7 21.2 
Danske Bank Plc FINLAND 26680 17.2 55.7 8.9 
Nordea Bank Finland 
Plc 
FINLAND 304761 15.0 18.4 3.1 
OP-Pohjola Group FINLAND 100981 14.3 40.9 7.6 
BNP Paribas FRANCE 1800139 12.8 31.2 5.1 
BPCE Group FRANCE 1123520 12.8 32.9 5.2 
BPIFrance Financement FRANCE 30756   9.0 
Banque Centrale de 
Compensation 
FRANCE 254091   0.1 
Banque PSA Finance FRANCE 25117   13.1 
Caisse Francaise de 
Financement Local 
FRANCE 80017   1.7 
Caisse de Refinance-
ment de l'Habitat 
FRANCE 53134   0.6 
Credit Agricole Group FRANCE 1706326 13.1 30.7 4.8 
Credit Mutuel (Combi-
ned - IFRS) 
FRANCE 645216 14.5 30.0 6.0 
HSBC France FRANCE 208893 13.7 15.5 2.6 
La Banque Postale FRANCE 200232 13.2 22.6 4.3 
RCI Banque FRANCE 29505   9.9 
Societe Generale FRANCE 1235262 13.4 25.6 4.4 
Aareal Bank AG GERMANY 42981 18.5 30.6 5.7 
Bayerische Landes-
bank 
GERMANY 255601 15.8 34.2 5.8 
Commerzbank AG GERMANY 549661 13.5 34.6 4.9 
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DekaBank Deutsche 
Girozentrale 
GERMANY 116073 15.6 19.3 3.2 
Deutsche Apotheker- 
und Aerztebank eG 
GERMANY 34692 17.0 31.4 6.3 
Deutsche Bank AG GERMANY 1611400 16.9 18.6 3.4 
Deutsche Zentral-
Genossenschaftsbank 
GERMANY 386978 16.4 22.0 3.7 
HASPA Finanzholding GERMANY 41611 10.6 71.1 9.3 
HSH Nordbank AG GERMANY 109022 15.3 33.6 4.1 
Hypo Real Estate Hold-
ing AG 
GERMANY 122454 32.5 14.5 5.2 
IKB Deutsche Indust-
riebank AG 
GERMANY 24045 13.1 58.0 6.5 
KfW Ipex-Bank Gmbh GERMANY 23280   14.9 
Landesbank Baden-
Wuerttemberg 
GERMANY 273523 18.5 29.1 4.9 
Landesbank Berlin 
Holding AG 
GERMANY 102437 11.9 24.9 2.3 
Landesbank Hessen-
Thueringen - HELABA 
GERMANY 178083 12.8 30.9 4.0 
Landeskreditbank Ba-
den-Wuerttemberg 
GERMANY 70141 15.7 25.5 4.3 
Landwirtschaftliche 
Rentenbank 
GERMANY 81932 23.9 16.5 3.9 
Muenchener Hypothe-
kenbank eG 
GERMANY 34717 11.7 21.2 2.6 
NRWBANK GERMANY 143153 44.0 27.1 12.9 
Norddeutsche Landes-
bank 
GERMANY 200845 11.8 34.1 4.1 
SEB AG GERMANY 31754 13.6 37.2 6.5 
Volkswagen Financial 
Services AG 
GERMANY 90992 8.6 91.2 9.8 
WGZ-Bank AG GERMANY 90926   3.6 
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Wuestenrot und Wuert-
tembergische 
GERMANY 75043   4.3 
Alpha Bank AE GREECE 73697   11.4 
Eurobank Ergasias SA GREECE 77586 11.5 47.7 5.8 
National Bank of 
Greece SA 
GREECE 110930 10.3 50.1 7.1 
Piraeus Bank SA GREECE 85778 15.2 61.3 9.6 
Allied Irish Banks plc IRELAND 117734 14.3 53.0 8.9 
Bank of Ireland-
Governor and Compa-
ny 
IRELAND 132137 12.4 42.7 6.0 
Merrill Lynch Interna-
tional Bank Ltd 
IRELAND 294444   2.0 
Permanent TSB Plc IRELAND 37604 13.6 43.4 6.3 
Ulster Bank Ireland 
Limited 
IRELAND 35375 11.5 110.0 13.1 
Banca Carige SpA ITALY 42156 5.8 51.4 3.9 
Banca Monte dei Pa-
schi di Siena SpA 
ITALY 199106 10.6 42.4 3.1 
Banca Popolare di Mi-
lano SCaRL 
ITALY 49353 7.8 86.4 7.4 
Banca Popolare di 
Sondrio 
ITALY 32770 7.9 72.5 6.1 
Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza 
ITALY 45235 9.2 62.1 8.1 
Banca popolare 
dell'Emilia Romagna 
ITALY 61758 8.6 69.6 7.6 
Banco Popolare - 
Societa Cooperativa 
ITALY 126043 10.6 39.1 6.8 
Credito Emiliano SpA-
CREDEM 
ITALY 31531 9.9 52.4 6.8 
Credito Valtellinese 
Soc Coop 
ITALY 27199 8.6 64.3 7.0 
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Iccrea Holding SpA ITALY 40045 9.3 35.2 3.7 
Intesa Sanpaolo ITALY 626283 12.2 44.3 7.2 
Mediobanca SpA ITALY 72841 11.7 71.9 9.5 
UniCredit SpA ITALY 845838 10.1 50.1 5.9 
Unione di Banche Itali-
ane Scpa-UBI 
ITALY 124242 13.2 49.1 9.0 
Veneto Banca scpa ITALY 37307 7.7 66.8 8.5 
ABLV Bank AS LATVIA 3281   5.7 
SEB banka AS LATVIA 4226   10.2 
Swedbank AS LATVIA 5000 28.0 62.5 20.2 
Banque Internationale 
a Luxembourg SA 
LUXEMBOURG 19699 14.9 22.1 5.9 
Banque et Caisse d'E-
pargne de l'Etat Lu-
xembourg 
LUXEMBOURG 40714 16.6 30.6 9.1 
Clearstream Banking 
SA 
LUXEMBOURG 11247   6.0 
KBL European Private 
Bankers SA 
LUXEMBOURG 12469 13.5 31.0 7.7 
RBC Investor Services 
Bank SA 
LUXEMBOURG 12574   7.3 
State Street Bank Lux-
embourg SA 
LUXEMBOURG 8742   32.9 
UBS (Luxembourg) SA LUXEMBOURG 9302   6.5 
Bank of Valletta Plc MALTA 7258 11.7 49.4 7.9 
HSBC Bank Malta Plc MALTA 5722 9.4 49.3 7.4 
ABN AMRO Group NV NETHERLANDS 372022 15.3 29.3 3.6 
Bank Nederlandse 
Gemeenten NV. BNG 
NETHERLANDS 131183 24.0 8.9 2.6 
ING Bank NV NETHERLANDS 787644 13.5 35.9 4.3 
Nederlandse Water-
schapsbank NV 
NETHERLANDS 73006   1.7 
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Rabobank Nederland-
Rabobank Group 
NETHERLANDS 674139 16.6 31.4 5.9 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
NV 
NETHERLANDS 39385   7.5 
SNS Bank NV NETHERLANDS 74537 16.6 19.5 3.5 
Banco BPI SA PORTUGAL 42700 16.2 51.0 5.4 
Banco Comercial Por-
tugues 
PORTUGAL 82007 12.9 53.4 4.0 
Caixa Geral de Deposi-
tos 
PORTUGAL 112963 11.3 54.9 6.0 
Espirito Santo Finan-
cial Group SA 
PORTUGAL 84850 9.2 70.3 7.9 
Slovenska sporitel'na 
as-Slovak Savings 
Bank 
SLOVAKIA 11699 20.8 40.0 11.0 
Tatra Banka as SLOVAKIA 9469   10.7 
Vseobecna Uverova 
Banka as 
SLOVAKIA 11556 15.9 59.0 11.9 
NLB dd-Nova Ljubl-
janska Banka dd 
SLOVENIA 12490 14.9 64.5 10.2 
Nova Kreditna Banka 
Maribor dd 
SLOVENIA 4811 18.1 59.8 11.6 
SID - Slovene Export 
and Development Bank 
SLOVENIA 3940   9.5 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria SA 
SPAIN 582575 12.2 55.7 7.7 
Banco Financiero y de 
Ahorros SA 
SPAIN 269159 11.8 35.1 4.6 
Banco Mare Nostrum 
SA-BMN 
SPAIN 47519 10.3 39.3 4.4 
Banco Popular Espanol 
SA 
SPAIN 147852 12.0 54.5 7.9 
Banco Santander SA SPAIN 1115638 12.6 43.9 7.2 
Banco de Sabadell SA SPAIN 163442 12.0 44.4 6.4 
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Bankinter SA SPAIN 55136 12.9 41.3 6.2 
CAJAMAR Sociedad 
Cooperativa de Credito 
SPAIN 42105   6.6 
Caja Espana de Inver-
siones Salamanca 
SPAIN 35527   1.8 
Catalunya Banc SA SPAIN 63062 14.3 28.7 4.0 
Ibercaja Banco SAU SPAIN 63118 10.3 38.1 4.1 
Kutxabank SA SPAIN 60762 12.0 60.1 8.1 
LA CAIXA SPAIN 351269 12.7 39.7 7.8 
Liberbank SA SPAIN 44547 10.4 38.4 3.6 
NCG Banco SA SPAIN 52687 11.3 44.1 5.2 
Unicaja SPAIN 41243   5.1 
 
Table 2A: Basic Financial Statistics for the Banks included in the AQR  
for the End of the Year 2012  
Assets (= total assets) in million Euro; CET1 is the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (in %); 
RWA = ratio of risk-weighted assets relative to total assets (in %); Equity = ratio of 
book equity to total assets (in %). Datasource: Bankscope. 
Bank Country Assets CET1 RWA Equity 
BAWAG PSK Group AUSTRIA 41265 11.7 50.0 6.9 
Erste Group Bank AG AUSTRIA 213824 11.6 49.3 8.2 
Oesterreichische 
Volksbanken AG 
AUSTRIA 
27667 10.9 56.8 4.3 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Oesterreich AG 
AUSTRIA 
145955 13.9 49.5 8.3 
Raiffeisenlandesbank 
Niederoesterreich-
Wien AG 
AUSTRIA 
32310 10.3 44.0 7.5 
Raiffeisenlandesbank 
Oberoesterreich AG 
AUSTRIA 
39823 9.3 71.2 8.7 
AXA Bank Europe BELGIUM 39217 16.5 12.5 2.1 
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SA/NV 
Argenta Spaarbank-
ASPA 
BELGIUM 
34145   3.8 
Bank of New York 
Mellon SA/NV 
BELGIUM 
53982 17.3 16.8 3.5 
Belfius Banque SA/NV BELGIUM 212947 13.3 23.6 2.5 
Dexia BELGIUM 357210 19.9 15.5 0.9 
KBC Groep NV/ KBC 
Groupe SA 
BELGIUM 
256886 13.8 39.8 6.2 
Bank of Cyprus Public 
Company Ltd 
CYPRUS 
31032 0.6 69.5 1.1 
Co-operative Central 
Bank Limited 
CYPRUS 
    Hellenic Bank Public 
Company Limited 
CYPRUS 
8756 8.2 60.7 5.5 
RCB Bank Ltd CYPRUS     
DNB Pank AS ESTONIA 485   19.4 
SEB Pank ESTONIA 4183 23.1 72.4 16.8 
Swedbank As ESTONIA 8961   20.4 
Danske Bank Plc FINLAND 31813 15.8 51.3 7.5 
Nordea Bank Finland 
Plc 
FINLAND 
341947 18.0 13.4 2.7 
OP-Pohjola Group FINLAND 99769 14.0 38.2 7.2 
BNP Paribas FRANCE 1907290 13.6 28.9 5.0 
BPCE Group FRANCE 1147521 12.2 33.2 4.7 
BPIFrance Financement FRANCE 29941 10.5 83.1 16.2 
Banque Centrale de 
Compensation 
FRANCE 
254091   0.1 
Banque PSA Finance FRANCE 27186   12.6 
Caisse Francaise de 
Financement Local 
FRANCE 
92037   1.3 
Caisse de Refinance- FRANCE 55338   0.6 
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ment de l'Habitat 
Credit Agricole Group FRANCE 2008152 13.3 23.9 3.8 
Credit Mutuel (Combi-
ned - IFRS) 
FRANCE 
645216 14.5 30.0 6.0 
HSBC France FRANCE 225208 13.6 13.5 2.3 
La Banque Postale FRANCE 195787 12.1 20.0 3.6 
RCI Banque FRANCE 28767   9.3 
Societe Generale FRANCE 1250696 12.5 25.9 4.3 
Aareal Bank AG GERMANY 45734 16.7 31.7 5.1 
Bayerische Landes-
bank 
GERMANY 
286823 12.9 35.0 5.3 
Commerzbank AG GERMANY 635878 13.1 32.7 4.3 
DekaBank Deutsche 
Girozentrale 
GERMANY 
129744 14.0 18.2 2.8 
Deutsche Apotheker- 
und Aerztebank eG 
GERMANY 
37886   5.2 
Deutsche Bank AG GERMANY 2012329 15.1 16.6 2.7 
Deutsche Zentral-
Genossenschaftsbank 
GERMANY 
407236 13.6 22.0 3.1 
HASPA Finanzholding GERMANY 41611   9.3 
HSH Nordbank AG GERMANY 130606 11.5 46.7 4.0 
Hypo Real Estate Hold-
ing AG 
GERMANY 
168977 31.3 10.8 3.7 
IKB Deutsche Indust-
riebank AG 
GERMANY 
26923 9.8 58.5 4.2 
KfW Ipex-Bank Gmbh GERMANY 23365   14.6 
Landesbank Baden-
Wuerttemberg 
GERMANY 
336326 15.3 28.5 3.1 
Landesbank Berlin 
Holding AG 
GERMANY 
118298 12.2 24.2 2.3 
Landesbank Hessen-
Thueringen - HELABA 
GERMANY 
199301 11.4 30.5 3.4 
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Landeskreditbank Ba-
den-Wuerttemberg 
GERMANY 
70096   4.1 
Landwirtschaftliche 
Rentenbank 
GERMANY 
88398   2.9 
Muenchener Hypothe-
kenbank eG 
GERMANY 
36643   2.2 
NRWBANK GERMANY 146828  23.2 12.5 
Norddeutsche Landes-
bank 
GERMANY 
225550 10.9 34.5 3.4 
SEB AG GERMANY 35634 12.2 35.6 5.8 
Volkswagen Financial 
Services AG 
GERMANY 
87379 9.2 87.2 10.1 
WGZ-Bank AG GERMANY 96082   3.2 
Wuestenrot und Wuert-
tembergische 
GERMANY 
77193   4.4 
Alpha Bank AE GREECE 58357   1.3 
Eurobank Ergasias SA GREECE 67653 116.4 5.6 -1.0 
National Bank of 
Greece SA 
GREECE 
104799 -6.7 61.6 -1.8 
Piraeus Bank SA GREECE 63020 10.3 56.7 -4.3 
Allied Irish Banks plc IRELAND 122516 15.1 58.3 9.2 
Bank of Ireland-
Governor and Compa-
ny 
IRELAND 
148146 14.5 38.1 5.8 
Merrill Lynch Interna-
tional Bank Ltd 
IRELAND 
371741   1.8 
Permanent TSB Plc IRELAND 40919 18.4 36.3 6.9 
Ulster Bank Ireland 
Limited 
IRELAND 
40912 11.4 110.7 20.2 
Banca Carige SpA ITALY 49326 7.4 49.4 7.5 
Banca Monte dei Pa-
schi di Siena SpA 
ITALY 
218882 9.6 42.4 2.9 
Banca Popolare di Mi- ITALY 52475 9.0 82.3 7.7 
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lano SCaRL 
Banca Popolare di 
Sondrio 
ITALY 
32349 7.6 75.0 6.0 
Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza 
ITALY 
46709 8.2 61.8 7.2 
Banca popolare 
dell'Emilia Romagna 
ITALY 
61638 8.3 72.6 7.7 
Banco Popolare - 
Societa Cooperativa 
ITALY 
131921 11.2 41.8 6.8 
Credito Emiliano SpA-
CREDEM 
ITALY 
30749 9.4 54.3 6.5 
Credito Valtellinese 
Soc Coop 
ITALY 
29896 8.1 66.5 6.6 
Iccrea Holding SpA ITALY 40045 9.3 35.2 3.7 
Intesa Sanpaolo ITALY 673472 12.1 44.3 7.5 
Mediobanca SpA ITALY 78679 11.5 70.1 8.4 
UniCredit SpA ITALY 926828 11.4 46.1 7.2 
Unione di Banche Itali-
ane Scpa-UBI 
ITALY 
132434 10.8 57.8 8.0 
Veneto Banca scpa ITALY 40165 7.9 63.3 7.7 
ABLV Bank AS LATVIA 3039   4.9 
SEB banka AS LATVIA 3955   11.0 
Swedbank AS LATVIA 4912 21.7 75.1 18.5 
Banque Internationale 
a Luxembourg SA 
LUXEMBOURG 
21301 14.4 19.8 5.2 
Banque et Caisse d'E-
pargne de l'Etat Lu-
xembourg 
LUXEMBOURG 
40493   8.4 
Clearstream Banking 
SA 
LUXEMBOURG 
14280   4.8 
KBL European Private 
Bankers SA 
LUXEMBOURG 
12937 12.7 32.2 7.2 
RBC Investor Services LUXEMBOURG 12329   7.0 
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Bank SA 
State Street Bank Lux-
embourg SA 
LUXEMBOURG 
7541   35.5 
UBS (Luxembourg) SA LUXEMBOURG 9302   6.5 
Bank of Valletta Plc MALTA 7049 10.7 51.3 7.4 
HSBC Bank Malta Plc MALTA 5886 8.3 48.1 6.8 
ABN AMRO Group NV NETHERLANDS 394404 12.9 30.8 3.6 
Bank Nederlandse 
Gemeenten NV. BNG 
NETHERLANDS 
142228 22.0 8.2 1.9 
ING Bank NV NETHERLANDS 836068 14.3 33.3 4.5 
Nederlandse Water-
schapsbank NV 
NETHERLANDS 
76084  1.4 1.6 
Rabobank Nederland-
Rabobank Group 
NETHERLANDS 
752410 17.2 29.6 5.9 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
NV 
NETHERLANDS 
71401   2.5 
SNS Bank NV NETHERLANDS 81341 7.7 25.3 1.6 
Banco BPI SA PORTUGAL 44565 15.2 55.0 4.6 
Banco Comercial Por-
tugues 
PORTUGAL 
89744 12.4 59.4 4.5 
Caixa Geral de Deposi-
tos 
PORTUGAL 
116857 11.2 58.5 6.2 
Espirito Santo Finan-
cial Group SA 
PORTUGAL 
87574 10.1 74.3 9.3 
Slovenska sporitel'na 
as-Slovak Savings 
Bank 
SLOVAKIA 
11777 16.2 45.8 10.2 
Tatra Banka as SLOVAKIA 9073 17.1 61.8 11.7 
Vseobecna Uverova 
Banka as 
SLOVAKIA 
11216 15.1 62.5 11.8 
NLB dd-Nova Ljubl-
janska Banka dd 
SLOVENIA 
14335 9.1 77.1 8.0 
Nova Kreditna Banka SLOVENIA 5322 8.1 81.2 4.8 
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Maribor dd 
SID - Slovene Export 
and Development 
Bank 
SLOVENIA 
4258.8   8.5 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria SA 
SPAIN 
637785 10.8 51.6 6.9 
Banco Financiero y de 
Ahorros SA 
SPAIN 
309187 5.2 36.2 1.0 
Banco Mare Nostrum 
SA-BMN 
SPAIN 
63380  42.1 0.3 
Banco Popular Espanol 
SA 
SPAIN 
157618 10.3 56.3 6.3 
Banco Santander SA SPAIN 1269628 11.2 43.9 6.6 
Banco de Sabadell SA SPAIN 161547 10.6 45.8 5.7 
Bankinter SA SPAIN 58166 10.8 43.7 5.6 
CAJAMAR Sociedad 
Cooperativa de Credito 
SPAIN 
43097  57.1 5.8 
Caja Espana de Inver-
siones Salamanca 
SPAIN 
37891   -2.8 
Catalunya Banc SA SPAIN 74104   0.8 
Ibercaja Banco SAU SPAIN 44664 10.4 43.4 4.8 
Kutxabank SA SPAIN 66707 10.1 63.6 7.2 
LA CAIXA SPAIN 359109 10.4 47.8 6.9 
Liberbank SA SPAIN 46255 5.2 44.8 2.4 
NCG Banco SA SPAIN 59983 6.9 47.8 2.2 
Unicaja SPAIN 40714 11.2 44.4 5.0 
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Table 3A: The 49 Banks included in the Analysis of disaggregated 
Sovereign Bond Holdings (described in Section 4.4 of this Study) 
BANK COUNTRY 
Erste Group Bank AG AUSTRIA 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG AUSTRIA 
KBC Groep NV/ KBC Groupe SA BELGIUM 
Bank of Cyprus Public Company Ltd CYPRUS 
OP-Pohjola Group FINLAND 
BNP Paribas FRANCE 
BPCE Group FRANCE 
Credit Agricole Group FRANCE 
Societe Generale FRANCE 
Bayerische Landesbank GERMANY 
Commerzbank AG GERMANY 
DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale GERMANY 
Deutsche Bank AG GERMANY 
Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank GERMANY 
HSH Nordbank AG GERMANY 
Hypo Real Estate Holding AG GERMANY 
Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg GERMANY 
Landesbank Berlin Holding AG GERMANY 
Landesbank Hessen-Thueringen - HELABA GERMANY 
Norddeutsche Landesbank GERMANY 
WGZ-Bank AG GERMANY 
Alpha Bank AE GREECE 
Eurobank Ergasias SA GREECE 
National Bank of Greece SA GREECE 
Piraeus Bank SA GREECE 
Allied Irish Banks plc IRELAND 
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Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company IRELAND 
Permanent TSB Plc IRELAND 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA ITALY 
Banco Popolare - Societa Cooperativa ITALY 
Intesa Sanpaolo ITALY 
UniCredit SpA ITALY 
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa-UBI ITALY 
Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat Luxem-
bourg 
LUXEMBOURG 
Bank of Valletta Plc MALTA 
ABN AMRO Group NV NETHERLANDS 
ING Bank NV NETHERLANDS 
Rabobank Nederland-Rabobank Group NETHERLANDS 
SNS Bank NV NETHERLANDS 
Banco BPI SA PORTUGAL 
Banco Comercial Portugues PORTUGAL 
Caixa Geral de Depositos PORTUGAL 
Espirito Santo Financial Group SA PORTUGAL 
NLB dd-Nova Ljubljanska Banka dd SLOVENIA 
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor dd SLOVENIA 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA SPAIN 
Banco Popular Espanol SA SPAIN 
Banco Santander SA SPAIN 
LA CAIXA SPAIN 
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Table 4A: Results for the Status quo Scenario for the largest 49 Banks in 
the Eurozone (see Section 4.4 of this Study)  
EQ3 and EQ4: Thresholds for the ratio of book equity to (not-risk weighted) total as-
sets of either 3% or 4%. CET1-5.5, CET1-8, CET1-12: Thresholds for the common equity 
tier 1 ratio of 5.5% (for stress scenarios only), 8%, and 12%. In million Euro. 
 EQ3 EQ4 CET1-5.5 CET1-8 CET1-12 
AUSTRIA 0 0 0 0 1625 
BELGIUM 0 0 0 0 0 
CYPRUS 0 0 0 0 402 
FINLAND 0 0 0 0 0 
FRANCE 0 0 0 0 0 
GERMANY 732 13847 0 0 143 
GREECE 0 0 0 0 1130 
IRELAND 0 0 0 0 0 
ITALY 0 1800 0 0 9947 
LUXEMBOURG 0 0 0 0 0 
MALTA 0 0 0 0 11 
NETHERLANDS 0 1712 0 0 0 
PORTUGAL 0 4 0 0 1669 
SLOVENIA 0 0 0 0 0 
SPAIN 0 0 0 0 16 
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Table 5A: Effects of a 40% Haircut on Spanish Sovereign Bonds: Addi-
tional Capital Requirements compared to the unstressed Scenario16 
EQ3 and EQ4: Thresholds for the ratio of book equity to not-risk weighted total assets 
of either 3 or 4%. CET1-5.5, CET1-8, CET1-12: Thresholds for the CET1 ratio of 5.5% (for 
stress scenarios only), 8%, and 12%. In million Euro. 
 EQ3 EQ4 CET1-5.5 CET1-8 CeT1-12 
AUSTRIA 0 0 0 0 9 
BELGIUM 0 0 0 0 0 
CYPRUS 0 0 0 0 0 
FINLAND 0 0 0 0 0 
FRANCE 0 0 0 0 0 
GERMANY 81 2282 0 0 209 
GREECE 0 0 0 0 3 
IRELAND 0 0 0 0 0 
ITALY 0 91 0 0 328 
LUXEMBOURG 0 0 0 0 0 
MALTA 0 0 0 0 0 
NETHERLANDS 0 35 0 0 0 
PORTUGAL 0 17 0 0 4539 
SLOVENIA 0 0 0 0 0 
SPAIN 0 0 2807 12101 53474 
 
16 The results for the unstressed scenario for these 49 banks are shown in Table 4A in 
the Appendix. 
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